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We consrder a two-person zero-sum Markov game with continuous time up to 
the trme that the game process goes into a fixed subset of a countable state space. 
thus subset is called a stopped set of the game. We show that such a game with a 
drscount factor has optimal value functron and both players will have therr optimal 
stationary strategies. The same result IS proved for the case of a nondiscounted 
Markov game under some additronal conditrons. that is a reward rate fimctron is 
nonnegative and the first time r (entrance time) of the game process going to the 
stopped set is finite with probability one (i.e., p(r < co) = I). It is remarkable that 
in the case of a nondiscounted Markov game, if the expectation of the entrance time 
IS bounded. and the reward rate function need not be nonnegative. then the same 
result holds. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
A discrete-time Markov game is formulated as a stochastic game in 
Shapley [6]. Maitra and Parthasarathy [5] investigated a Markov game with 
infinite horizon by using the results of discounted dynamic programming. 
Furthermore, in 1978. Tanaka and Wakuta [S] considered a continuous-time 
discounted Markov game with infinite horizon by using the results of the 
continuous-time Markov decision process which is given mainly in 
Kakumanu [l, 21. 
None of the above papers are concerned with stopped sets. In this paper. 
we consider a two-person zero-sum Markov game with a stopped set. Our 
purpose is to analyze a minimax problem of this game, that is. to maximize 
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the total expected gain for one player and at the same time, to minimize the 
total expected loss for another player. To this end, we study first the case of 
discounted continuous Markov game, and then we discuss the nondiscounted 
game in which the game would have a stopped set. These games have 
optimal value functions and both players have their optimal stationary 
strategies. The results and methods presented in this paper are new and it 
may be extendable to apply in n-person noncooperative Markov games to 
obtain the stationary equilibrium point in which each player possesses an 
equilibrium stationary strategy. 
2. THE FORMULATION OF A CONTINUOUS TIME MARKOV GAME 
WITH A STOPPED SET 
We determine a continuous-time Markov game with a stopped set by 
seven objects (S, S’, A, B, q, r, a). Here S = (1, 2, 3 ,..., n ,... } is the set of 
states of the game; S’ is a subset of S regarded as a stopped set; A and B are 
nonempty Bore1 subsets of a Polish space, i.e., a complete separable metric 
space denoting the sets of actions of the player I and player II, respectively; 
4 is a transition rate function which controls the motion of the game process, 
it is a bounded function q(. ) i, a, b) on S for any given triple (i. a, 6) E 
SxAxBatanytimetE[O,ao);r(.,~, .) is a bounded measurable function 
on S x A x B at any time t, namely, a reward rate function; a is a positive 
number regard as a discount factor of the game. This game (S, S’, A. B. q, r, 
a) is called a discounted continuous time Markov game with a stopped set. If 
a = 0 such a game is called a nondiscounted continuous time Markov game 
with a stopped set, and is simply written by (S, S’, A, B, q, r). 
In the game processes, player I and player II are continuously to observe 
the state of the game process, and at any time t E [0, co), for state i E S, the 
two players choose actions a E A, b E B, respectively. For such i E S and 
a E A, b E B, the game obeys a rule that player II should pay player I by a 
reward rate r(i, a, b), and then the process moves to a new state j by a tran- 
sition rate function q(j 1 i, a. b) at any time t. If j E S’, then they stop the 
game. otherwise (jtZ S’) they continue the game process and the new 
decisions are carried by them to the new state j E S. 
We begin with some definitions and assumptions for the necessity of our 
main results. We assume that the Markov strategies of player I and player II 
are independent of the past history in the game process, they depend only on 
the present state. A Markov strategy 7f = n(t) (resp. cr = u(t)) for player I 
(resp. for player II) is a specified family {p,} (resp. A,), where ,u~ (resp. A,) is 
the function ,u~(MI i) of i, t and A4, such that for each i E S and t E [O. co ), 
P,(- Ii) (rew. &(a I 9) is a probability measure on the measurable space 
(A, P(A)) (resp. (B, P(B)), where j?(A) is the u-field generated by the metric 
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topology on A, and that for each i E S, ME /l(A) (resp. p(B)), P. (MJi) 
(resp. ,l. (MI i)) is a Lebesgue measurable function on t E [0, co). A Markov 
strategy rr = n(f) is said to be stationary if z(t) is independent of t. that is, 
there exists a map ,u from S into P(A) (resp. P(B)) such that pI =,u (resp. 
Ar = 1) for all t E [0, co), where P(A) (resp. P(B)) is the set of all probability 
measures on (A. P(A)) (resp. (B, p(B)). Let n (resp. f) denote the class of all 
Markov strategies for player I (resp. player II). 
We denote the transition rate matrix by 
Q(a, b) = WI L a, b): 4 j E S I 
for each a E A and b E B. Throughout this paper, we would consider the 
following assumption. 
ASSUMPTION 1. For any ? E [0, co), the transition rate function 
q(j ( i, a, b) is continuous on A X B for any i, j in S such that 
q(j I 4 a, b) 2 0 if j # i, 
z q( j( i, a, b) = 0 
for all a E A, b E B and there exists M > 0 such that 
lq(ili, a, b)l GM 
for all i E S and a E A, b E B. 
For a pair (rc, a) of the Markov strategies 71 and u for player I and 
player II, the transition rate function is defined by 
q(jli, f, n, a) = q(jli, LPu,v 4) 
. _ = J! B A djlk a9 b) 4&/i) WW 
for time t E [0, co), where the strategies z and o are specified by the families 
(,u,} and (A,}, respectively. This function q(j(i, t, rt, a) is clearly Lebesgue 
measurable in f E [0, co) for any i, j E S and satisfies the following con- 
ditions. 
By Assumption 1, for each t > 0, 
djli, 4 R,u) > 0, j # i, 
x q(j( i, t, 71,~) = 0, 
(1) 
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and 
I q(il i, 6 R, u)I < hf. (2) 
We write the matrix of transition rate functions with respect o 7c and u as 
Q(t. R, u) = Q(f, ,ur, A,) = {q(jl i, t, 71, a); i, j E S 1, 
and if T and u are stationary strategies, then we write Q(7c, a) = Q@, 1) 
instead of Q(t, 71, o) E Q(t, rut, 1,). 
Under conditions (1) and (2), Kakumanu [ 1 ] showed that there exists a 
unique stochastic matrix 
corresponding to Q(t, rr, u) such that it satisfies the Kolmogorov forward 
differential equation: For almost all f E [s, a), 
; F(s, t, R, u) = F(s, I, n, u) Q(t, n, a) (3) 
with initial condition 
F(s, s, 71, a) = z, 
where Z is an infinite indentity matrix. 
It can be shown that there exists a measurable Markov process {X(f, n, a); 
f > s) corresponding to the stochastic matrix F(s, t, IL, a) and is well behaved. 
In the following, we assume that the state moves according to the Markov 
process (X(t, z, a); t > s) with initial time s = 0, and write F(f, 7c, a) instead 
of F(0, I, 71, a). 
Next we want the following: 
ASSUMPTION 2. For any f E [0, co), the reward rate function r(i, a, 6) is 
continuous on A x B for any i E S - S’, and r(k, a, b) = r(k) is independent 
ofbothaEA andbEBwhenkES’. 
Now. by Assumption 2, we can define the total expected gain function of 
the player I as following: 
When a pair (71, a) of the Markov strategies TC and CJ is chosen by the two 
players at any time t, the expected gain rate function for player I due to the 
state i E S is given by 
r(i, t, ~,u) = r(i, t, rut, 1,) 
= 
II r(i, a, b) &(a Ii) dW I i) 
if iES-S’, 
BA 
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r(k. t, 7c. a) = r(k) if kES’. 
It is clear that for any chosen i E S a pair (z, a) of strategies rc and (T. the 
rate function r(i, t, rr, a) is Lebesgue measurable in t E [0, co). If the pair 
(r, a) of strategies is stationary, then we write r(i, rr, a) = r(i, p, A) instead of 
r(i, t, z, o) E t(i, t, p,, A,). Thus as the game process starts from a state i E S 
and a pair (7c, a) of Markov strategies is chosen, then the total expected gain 
with discount factor a for player I is defined as 
vi(a, 71, a) = E IT e-“’ r(X(t), t, 71, u) dt + em”‘r(X(s)) 1 X(0) = i , 
I 
(4) 
-0 
where r is the first entrance time of the Markov process from the initial state 
i into the stopped set S’. Note that r, X(t) and the expectation operator E are 
dependent on both 7c and u. In particular if a = 0, we write ~~(71, cr) instead of 
Vi(OY ll* u)* 
A Merkov strategy n* is optimal for player I if 
inf sup w,(cf. II, a) < v/~(u. rt*. a’) 
OGI- TErf 
for any u’ E r and i E S. A Markov strategy u* is optimal for player II if 
for any 7~’ E 17 and i E S. We say that such game is strictly determined if 
sup inf ~,(a. i-r. a) = inf sup y,(a. 71, a). 
Ten 0er oer TErl 
for any initial state i E S. This common quantity is a function on S and is 
called optimal value fhction of the game. In the case of a = 0, the 
definitions of the optimal Markov strategies for both players and the optimal 
value function of the game are defined analogously. 
3. THE EXISTENCE OF OPTIMAL STATIONARY STRATEGIES IN A 
DISCOUNTED CONTINUOUS-TIME MARKOV GAME 
In this section we study the existence theorem of the optimal stationary 
strategies in the Markov game (S, S’, A, B, q, r, a). Let C(S) denote the 
family of all bounded functions u on S in which if k E S’, then the function 
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value u(k) is equal to r(k). For u E C(S), we define the norm )] u]] = 
supieS ]u(i)] and d(u, v) = I] u - c’]) f or any U, ~1 E C(S). Then (C(S), d) is a 
complete metric space. 
In order to prove the main result, we give the following: 
ASSUMPTION 3. A and B are compact metric spaces. 
By Assumption 3, it is evident that P(A) and P(B) are compact metric 
spaces with weak topologies. Throughout this paper, we assume that the 
spaces P(A) and P(B) are endowed with the weak topologies. 
LEMMA 1. For each iE S and u E C(S), it can be shown that 
s q(jli, a, 6) u(j) converges uniformly on a and b at any time t. So that 
cj q( jl i, a, 6) u(j) is a bounded continuous function on A X B. 
This lemma is proved in [8]. 
Now we consider the case of discrete time for a moment that for each 
iu E P(A) and II E P(B), we define a new one-step transition probability 
matrix P(,u, A) in terms of Q@, 1) by 
Pk. A) = I + (l/M) Q(& 1) (5) 
whose (i, j)th element is given by 
p(j( i, pu. 1) = 6ij + (l/M) q( jl i, /L A), (6) 
where M > 0 is given in Assumption 1, and a,, is the Kronecker delta. By 
Assumption 3, we see that P(A) and P(B) are compact metric spaces and for 
each i E S in the case of stationary strategies, it follows from Assumption 2 
and Lemma 1 that r(i, p,,I) and xi p( j I i, ,D, I) u(j) are continuous functions 
on P(A) x P(B). Thus if we define an operator T on every u in C(S) by: 
Tu(i) = max rnjn 
B i 
’ rU, P, 1) + M 
a+M a+~ C djl iv fiu, 1) u(j) J I 
for iES-S’ 
and 
Tu(k) = r(k) for kE S’, 
where a > 0 is a discount factor in the game, then this operator is a 
contraction mapping on C(S) since 0 < M(cr + M) -’ < 1. Furthermore since 
C(S) is a complete metric space, it follows that the operator T has a unique 
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fixed point in C(S) by the Banach’s fixed point Theorem. Let ~12 E C(S) be 
such a unique fixed point of T. Then 
and 
for iES-S’ (7) 
u,*(k) = r(k) for kES’. 
BY (6), p(jli, P, A) can be written in terms of q(j] i. ,u, A), hence we obtain 
(a + W u,*(i) = mfx “;‘n !r(i, p. A) + Mu,*(i) + x &Ii, p, A) u:(j)1 
.I 
for any i E S - S’. Consequently, if we write 
then 
(9) 
for iES-S’ and 
v,*(k) = r(k) for kES’. 
Next, for each ,U E P(A) and A E P(B). we define in an operator L@. A) on 
every u in C(S) by: 
and 
Up, 1) u(i) = 4, P, A) + Qf,u, A) u(i) if iES-S’ 
UP, A) u(k) = r(k) if k E S’. 
It follows that for each u E C(S), L(u, A) u(i) is a continuous bilinear 
function on the compact set P(A) x P(B). Consequently, by Sion’s minimax 
Theorem (Theorem 3,4 in 171) we have 
max mjn L(u, I) u(i) = m;‘n max L(u, A) u(i) 
11 L 
for each i E S and u E C(S). Moreover, since P(A) and P(B) are compact, 
AMARKOVGAMEWITHA STOPPED SET 61 
there exist maps ~1,* and AZ from S into P(A) and P(B), respectively, such 
that for each i E S - S’ and v,* E C(S), we have 
au:(i) = rnjn L(j.4,*, I) u:(i) 
= max rnjn L(u, A) v,*(i) 
u (10) 
= mjn max L(u, I) v,*(i) 
r 
= max Lb, A,*) v,*(i). 
II 
By the above preparation, we can prove the following theorem. 
THEOREM 1. Under Assumptions 1, 2, and 3, the discounted continuous 
Markov game with a stopped set has an optimal value function and both 
players have their optimal stationary strategies. 
ProoJ By (lo), it follows that there exists a map ,uU,* from S into P(A) 
such that for each i E S - S’, 
avx(i) = max rnjn L(u, 1) v:(i) 
u 
(11) 
= “;‘n L@,*, A) v,*(i). 
Moreover, for each i E S - S’ and any 1 E P(B), (11) implies 
av,*(i) ,< r(i, ,u1,*, 1) + Q@z, A) v,*(i). 
Hence, according to this stationary strategy, ,u,* for player I and any Markov 
strategy o for player II, it follows that for any t E [0, co), we have 
au,*(i) < r(i, t, P,*, 0) + Q(t. PU,*, 0) v,*(i) if iES-S’ (12) 
and 
v,*(k) = r(k) if k E S’. 
Next, for any Markov strategies 7c and u, we write 
RF*“‘u(i) = fin e-“‘F(t, II, a) u(i) dt 
-0 
u(X(t)) dt IX(O) = i 
I 
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for all u E C(S), where 
Qt. 7r, u) u(i) = \‘ Ai@, G(T) u(j) 
corresponds to the expression (8) of Q(n, a) u(i), then for every i E S - S’, 
by the Kolmogorov forward differential equation (3). we obtain 
.% Lx 
-aI e -nrF(t, p,*. a) t!,*(i) dt - a 1 e-^‘F(r, p,*, a) Q(t, ,uI,*, a) c,*(i) dt .a .O 
I F 
=a( e 
.a 
p”fF(t,p,*, a) v*(i) df - (I e-“’ g F(t. pu,*, a) c,*(i) df 
.O 
= F(0, ,uu,*, a) u,*(i) 
(this follows from integration by parts) 
= u,*(i); (13) 
the last equality follows from the initial condition F(O,pz, a) = I. 
Formula (13) can be written as 
=E joxe 
L 
-“‘{al - Q(t, p,*, a)} cz(X(t)) dt / X(0) = i 
1 
{e-“‘W - Q(r, &, 4) u3-W)) dl I JW) = il , 
I 
(14) 
where r is the first entrance time from the initial state i into the stopped set 
S’. Moreover. by using the strong Markov property and (13), the second 
term in the last equation of (14) can be written as 
I 
.z 
E !T e -nf(aZ - Q(t. pu,*. a)} v,*(X(t)) dt 1 X(0) = i I 
= E 
L 
emOrE )_/ x e -at(aZ- Q(t + s.,u,*. u))~,“(X(t + s))dr )X(r) ( 
1 I 
X(O)=i 
0 
= E[em”‘cX(X(s)) / X(0) = i] 
= E[ep”‘r(X(t)) 1 X(0) = il. (15) 
A MARKOV GAME WITH A STOPPED SET 63 
From (14) and (15), for any i E S - S’, we have 
.r 
u:(i) = E e-“‘{u*(X(r)) - Q&P:, 0) uXW))\ d 
0 
+ e-“‘r(X(r)) 1 X(0) = i 
I 
, (16) 
(17) 
(18) 
Inserting (12) into the integrand of (16), it follows that 
L’,*(i) < Wi(G P1,*1 u, if iES-S’ 
and 
u,*(k) = r(k) if k E S’. 
It follows from (17) that, for each i E S, 
o,*(i) < inf v,(a,p,*, 0) < sup inf Wi(a, rc, a). 
0er %en oer 
Similarly, we also have 
(19) 
for each i E S, where A,* is the stationary strategy defined in (10) for 
player II. 
On the other hand, in general, we have 
(20) 
for each i E S. 
By (18), (19) and (20), we obtain that ~7: E C(S) is the optimal value 
function of the game, and ,~u,* and AZ are optimal stationary strategies for 
player I and player II, respectively. Hence the proof is complete. 1 
4. THE EXISTENCE OF OPTIMAL STATIONARY STRATEGIES IN A 
NONDISCOUNTE~ CONTINUOUS-TIME MARKOV GAME 
In this section we consider the optimal strategies in the case of 
nondiscounted Markov game (S, S’, A, B, q, r). We would show that there 
exist the optimal stationary strategies for player I and player II. It needs the 
following assumptions. 
40986/l S 
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ASSUMPTION 2’. For each i E S - S’, the reward rate function r(i, a, b) 
is nonnegative continuous on A x B, and for each k E S’, r(k, a, b) = r(k) is 
nonnegative and independent of both a E A and b E B at any time 
t E [O, al). 
ASSUMP~ON 4. vi(lr, 0) is bounded for all states i E S and all pairs 
(71, u) of the Markov strategies II and cr. The first entrance time r of the game 
process into stopped set S’ is finite with probability 1 (i.e., ~(r < co) = 1) 
for any initial state X(0) = i. 
Thus we can prove the following theorem. 
THEOREM 2. Under Assumptions 1, 2’, 3 and 4, the nondiscounted 
Markov game with a stopped set has an optimal value function and both 
players have their optimal stationary strategies. 
Proof. From Theorem 1, for every discount factor a > 0, there exists an 
optimal stationary strategy pu,* with respect o player I and a value function 
v,*(i) of the game such that 
V/it@ Pu,*, 0) >, v,*(i) for all CJ E r and i E S. 
Now, in the case of nondiscounted Markov game, we take one stationary 
strategy ,U as the optimal stationary strategy p,* for player I in Theorem 1; 
i.e., p =,u,* in vi@, 0). Then, by Assumption 2’, it follows that 
for all a > 0 and any u E f, i E S. Therefore we have 
Viol,*, 0) > v,*(i) for any u E r, iE S. 
The above inequality implies that 
Sup sup yi(7r, 0) > v:(i) > 0 
Nan oer (21) 
for every a > 0 and i E S. It follows from Assumption 4 and (21) that v,*(i) 
is bounded for all i E S and all a E [0, 11, further v:(i) is increasing when a 
decreases to zero. Hence the limit lim,,, v,*(i) = v*(i) exists for each i E S. 
In order to complete this theorem, we need to establish first that there 
exists Iz* E P(B) such that 
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for any i E S. To prove the above inequalities, we start from (10) that v,*(i) 
and AZ satisfy the following relations: 
au,*(i) = mjn m,a” (r(i, p, I) + Q(p, A) u,*(i) 1 
= m,a” {r(i,~, A,*> + Q@, A*) u,*(i)} (22) 
for every a>0 and any ifs---S’. Since S is countable and u:(i) is 
bounded for all a and all i E S, by the diagonalization method, there exists a 
sequence a,, + 0 as n --$ co such that 
lim u:,(i) = u*(i) 
n-cc 
for all i E S 
that is V* E C(S) is the common limit of lim,“+, u:, for each i. On the other 
hand, since P(B) is weakly compact, the sequence a, corresponds a sequence 
of strategies At of player II, which converges weakly to A* E P(B) as 
n + 00. It follows from the dominated convergence theorem that 
converges to 
QCu,~*)u*(i)~~q(jIi,~,d*)u*(j) 
i 
as n + 03 for each i E S. Thus as n + co in (22), we then have 
0 = mjn m;x (r(i,p, A) + Q(,u, A) u*(i)} 
=myr(i,p,A*)+Q@,A*)u*(i)). 
(23) 
For any time t E [0, co), Eq. (23) can be written by 
0 > r(i, t, 71, A.*) + Q(t,p, A*) u*(i) (24) 
for all 71 E l7. Define r, = r/im = min(z, m) for any positive integer m. Then 
r, is also a stopping time, it is bounded and r,,, + r with probability 1 as 
m + 03. By the same argument of (16), we obtain 
u,*,(i) = E 
-‘m 
[J e --On’ {a,1 - QO, x, AZ)) vX,(X(t)) tft 0 
+ e-anTw,*n(X(r,)) 1 X(0) = i 1 (25) 
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for all x E l7, a, > 0 and r,. Since r, is bounded, thus as n -+ co. a,, -+ 0 in 
(25) we obtain 
u*(i) = 
L 
E rrrn (-Q(t, 7c, A*) v*(X(t)) dr + rl*(X(r,)) I X(0) = i 
.o 
Inserting (24) into (26). we have 
u*(i)>E !;“‘r(X(t), t, 7c,A*)df + u*(X(r,)) IX(O)= il. 
1 (26) 
(27) 
From Assumption 1, the Markov process (X(t), f > 0) is well behaved, that 
is, when m is large enough, it would be r, = t for any sample path. Hence 
u “(X(r,)) = u*(x(r)) = r(X(r)) 
and as m + co in (27), we obtain 
u*(i) > iyi(7r, A*) for all n EZZ and iE S. 
This implies that 
for all i E S. 
Next, we need prove that 
(29) 
for some p* E P(A) and all i E S. To this end, from (10) we see that t’:(i) 
and ,u,* satisfy the following functional equation: 
au,*(i) = rn? rr$n { r(i, ,u, 1) + Q(,u, 1) o,*(i)} 
= mjn (r(i, ,D,*, A) + Q(u,*, A) u,*(i) 
for every a > 0 and i E S - S’. Then by the similar arguments in (23), (24). 
(25), (26) and (27), we can exchange min and max, A,* and ,uU,* in suitable to 
the context, and reverse the inequalities for the necessity in each situation, it 
is easy to show that (29) holds. 
On the other hand, in general, we have 
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for all i E S. Therefore, by (28), (29) and (30), the given nondiscounted 
game is strictly determined, and U* is the optimal value function of the game 
in which ,u* and A* are optimal stationary strategies of player I and 
player II, respectively. Hence the theorem is proved. 1 
5. REMARKS 
In Sections 3 and 4, we have proved Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 under the 
Assumptions 1, 2, 3 and the Assumptions 1, 2’, 3. 4 for the discounted and 
the nondiscounted Markov games, respectively. It is remarkable that in the 
nondiscounted Markov game, the conclusion of Theorem 2 holds under other 
conditions, that is, besides the Assumptions 1, 2 and 3. We now impose 
another assumption instead of Assumption 4 for the first entrance time r. 
ASSUMPTION 5. Let r be the first entrance time of the Markov process 
into the stopped set S’. For any pair (n, a) of the Markov strategies 7c and u, 
and any i E S, the expectation E[r 1 X(0) = i] is bounded. 
From Section 2 Eq. (4), for any a > 0 the value function v,*(i) of the 
discounted Markov game is satisfying the following inequality 
for any i E S. By Assumption 5, v,*(i) is bounded for any i E S and any 
a E [0, 11. Hence by the same argument in the proof of Theorem 2, there 
exists a sequence (v,*,(i)}. convergent to a function v*(i) in C(S) as n + co, 
a,, -+ 0 for all i E S. Therefore under the proof of Theorem 2, we obtain 
THEOREM 3. Under Assumption 1, 2, 3 and 5, the nondiscounted 
Markov game with stopped set has optimal value function and both of the 
players have their optimal stationary strategies. 
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